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I. INTRODUCTION
Inveterate to the American system of criminal jurisprudence is the
fundamental right to trial by jury.1 The right to trial by jury for the
criminal defendant is preserved by the Constitution of the United States
in both Article III2 and the Sixth Amendment.3 In Duncan v. Louisiana,
4
the United States Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment to the
Constitution applied to both the federal government and to the states by
incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment.5 Consequently, every
* Recipient of the Howard L. Oleck award for distinguished legal writing by
a student.
I Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
2 Article III, § 2 of the Constitution provides: "The Trial of all Crimes, except
in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by jury; and such Trial shall be held in the
State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed
within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may
by law have directed." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution provides in pertinent part: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed,..." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
4391 U.S. at 145.
1 Id. at 149.
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criminal defendant charged with a non-petty offense is entitled to trial
by jury, whether tried in a state or federal court.6
In capital cases, the words "trial by jury" take on added significance
due to the unique aspects of the death penalty. First, as the United States
Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia7 noted, "There is no question that
death as a punishment is unique in its severity and irrevocability. ' 8 Sec-
ond, the death penalty is unique given the role the jury plays in the
sentencing phase of a death penalty trial. Traditionally, juries are the
sole arbiters of guilt or innocence. That is, 'The Sixth Amendment right
to trial by jury in criminal cases is a right to have a jury decide the facts,
apply the law to them, and reach a verdict."9 The decision and imposition
of the sentence is then left up to the judge. Jury sentencing in criminal
cases is aberrational. In capital cases, by contrast, jury sentencing is the
norm, not the aberration. Of the thirty-seven states that have statutes
authorizing the death penalty,10 thirty-three states authorize the jury to
determine or recommend the penalty to the judge.1 Of these thirty-three
states, twenty-nine states allow a death sentence only if the jury rec-
ommends death, provided that the defendant has not waived the jury at
I John A. Wasliff, Note, Lockhart v. McCree: Death Qualification as a Deter-
minant of the Impartiality and Representativeness of a Jury in Death Penalty Cases,
72 CORNELL L. REV, 1075, 1076-77 (1987).
1428 U.S. 153 (1975).
'Id. at 187 (citation omitted).
'Stephen Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 45 (1980).
10 Thirty-seven states have statutes authorizing the death penalty: See ALA.
CODE § 13A-5-47 (1987 & Supp. 1990); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (Supp.
1991); ARK. CODE ANN- § 41-1301 (1977 & Supp. 1985); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3
(West 1986 Supp. 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-103 (West 1990); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a (West 1985 & Supp. 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §
4209 (1979 & Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN § 921.141 (West 1989 & Supp. 1991);
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-31 (1990 & Supp. 1991); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (1987 &
Supp. 1991); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1 (1987 & Supp. 1991); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 35-20-2-9 (Burns 1985 & Supp. 1986); Ky. REV. STAT, ANN. § 532.025 (Baldwin
1991); LA. CODE ClaM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.6 (West 1984 & Supp. 1991); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27 § 413 (1990 & Supp. 1991); MIss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101 (1990);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.030 (Vernon Supp. 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-301
(1990); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2522 (1985 & Supp. 1990); NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.554
(1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5 (Supp. 1990); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-
3c (West 1982 & Supp. 1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-3 (Michie 1990); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15A-2002 (1988 & Supp. 1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03
(Anderson 1982 & Supp. 1990); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.10 (West 1983 &
Supp. 1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150 (Supp. 1985); 4 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. §
9711 (Purdon 1982 & Supp. 1986) S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-26 (Law. Co-Op 1985
& Supp. 1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-27A-4 (1988 & Supp. 1991); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-3-204 (1991); TEx. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon
1981 & Supp. 1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207 (1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 2303(c) (1978 & Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4 (Michie 1983 & Supp.
1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.080 (West 1987 & Supp. 1991); and Wyo.
STAT. 6-2-102 (1977 & Supp. 1991).
" Of the 37 states that have statutes authorizing the death penalty, only in
four states-Arizona, Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska-does the court alone, with-
out any input from the jury, impose the sentence. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468
U.S. 447, 463 n.9 (1984).
[Vol. 39:605
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either the trial or sentencing stage. 2 Finally, aside from the severity,
irrevocability, and the uncustomary role of the jury as sentencer, the
death penalty is unique in terms of the justifications for punishment. Of
the four justifications for punishment-rehabilitation, incapacitation, de-
terrence, and retribution-retribution clearly plays the dominant role as
justification for capital punishment. 1" The decision to impose death is an
expression of community outrage. 14 Thus, because the jury represents a
fair cross section of the community, the jury is in the best position to
determine whether the crime committed is so heinous that the commu-
nity's response must be the penalty of death.'5
Despite the added importance of the jury in capital cases, the right to
trial by jury, like other constitutional rights, may be waived provided the
waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently and with suf-
ficient awareness of the relevant circumstances. 8
This Note analyzes both the federal and various state standards as to
what constitutes a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of trial by
jury in capital cases. Through this analysis it will become apparent that
the various standards among the different jurisdictions of a voluntary,
knowing, and intelligent waiver are marked with disparity. This Note
also argues that the jury waiver statutes in many jurisdictions fail to
provide enough information for the capital defendant to make a voluntary,
knowing, and intelligent waiver of the right to trial by jury while cog-
nizant of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. This de-
ficiency can be traced to the fact that most jury waiver statutes were
formulated in the non-capital arena and fail to take into consideration
the unique aspects of a death penalty proceeding. This Note then con-
cludes with a proposal that ideally, or perhaps even quixotically, provides
the capital defendant with enough information to make a voluntary,
knowing, and intelligent waiver of the constitutional right to trial by
jury.
II. WHAT THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT RELINQUISHES WHEN THE
RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY IS WAIVED
In non-capital cases, several motivations may underlie a criminal de-
fendant's decision to waive his right to a jury trial: pretrial publicity; the
12 Of the 37 states authorizing the death penalty, only in Alabama, Florida
and Indiana can the judge override a jury's recommendation of a life sentence.
Id. In Nevada, if the jury cannot unanimously agree on the sentence, a panel of
three judges may impose the sentence. Id.
13 See Gillers, supra note 9, at 53-54. See also Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S.
447, 462 (1984). Some commentators have suggested that retribution is the only
possible justification for capital punishment. See, e.g., Michael Mello and Ruthann
Robson, Judge over Jury: Florida's Practice of Imposing Death Over Life in Capital
Cases, 13 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 31, 45 (1985).
14 Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 461 (1984).
1Id.
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
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particularly heinous nature of the crime; the defendant's fear that the
jury may be prejudiced because of the defendant's race, religion, or prior
criminal record; 17 or the defendant's simple wish to shorten the time of
the trial. 8 In capital cases, these motivations may be equally applicable.
Yet, when a capital defendant waives his right to trial by jury, much
more is relinquished than the facially apparent substitution of having a
judge rather than a jury pass upon the accused's guilt or innocence.
As adumbrated in the introduction, the death penalty is qualitatively
different from any other form of punishment in its severity and irrev-
ocability,' in the predominant role of the jury as the sentencer, 20 and in
the predominant justification for its imposition-retribution. 21 It is the
last of these qualitative differences which is discussed first.
A. The Jury as a Link to the Community's Evolving
Standards of Decency
In general, there are four justifications for the imposition of punish-
ment: "(1) to rehabilitate the offender; (2) to incapacitate [the offender]
from committing offenses in the future; (3) to deter others from commit-
ting offenses; or (4) to assuage the victim's or the community's desire for
revenge or retribution. ' 22 Rehabilitation is obviously not applicable to
the death sentence. 23 Incapacitation "would be served by execution, but
in view of the availability of imprisonment as an alternative means of
preventing the defendant from violating the law in the future, the death
sentence would clearly be an excessive response to this concern. ' '24 De-
terrence, a consideration that factors into the death penalty decision, has
not provided the court with the sole calculus upon which the decision to
condemn a man to death has been made in any given case. 25 Moreover,
as one commentator notes, "the intuitive notion that the greater the
punishment, the greater its inevitable deterrent value is belied by four
decades of social science research demonstrating that capital punishment
deters no more effectively than does life imprisonment. '2 Consequently,
17 Fred A. DeCicco, Note, Waiver of Jury Trials in Federal Criminal Cases: A
Reassessment of the "Prosecutorial Veto," 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 1091 (1983) (foot-
notes omitted).
"1 See, e.g., Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965) (In Singer, the defendant
sought to shorten his trial by waiving his right to trial by jury.)
" See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976).
20 See supra notes 11 and 12.
21 See supra notes 13-15.
22 Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 477-78 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
23 Id. at 478.
- Id.
2Id. at 480.
26 Mello and Robson, supra note 13, at 45.
[Vol. 39:605
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this leaves retribution as the dominant, or arguably, the sole justification
behind the penalty of death.
27
In Gregg v. Georgia,28 the United States Supreme Court addressed the
retributionist nature of the death penalty by stating that "capital pun-
ishment is an expression of society's moral outrage at particularly offen-
sive conduct" and that "the decision that capital punishment may be the
appropriate sanction on extreme cases is an expression of the community's
belief that certain crimes are so grievous ... that the only ... response
may be the penalty of death.
29
B. The Composite Nature and Role of the Jury and Judge
Historically, juries have had a unique place in the theory and practice
of the American system of criminal jurisprudence. In Duncan v. Louisi-
ana,30 the United States Supreme Court stated that "[a] right to jury trial
is granted to criminal defendants in order to prevent oppression by the
Government" and that this right provides the accused with "an inestim-
able safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against
the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge."3' The Court further stated that
the right to be tried by a jury of one's peers "reflect[s] a fundamental
decision about the exercise of official power-a reluctance to entrust the
plenary powers over the life and liberty of the citizens to one judge or to
a group of judges. 3 2
Indeed, the safeguards inherent in the jury process are especially cru-
cial when the decision of innocence or guilt leads to a decision of life or
death. Because the jury represents the community, the sanction of death
is essentially an expression of community outrage: "The life-or-death
decision in capital cases depends upon its link to community values for
its moral and constitutional legitimacy."33 Juries have traditionally pro-
vided this invaluable link between capital punishment and the commu-
nity's standards of decency.34 Juries by nature are better able to assess
the community's values and moral sensibility than are judges. By defi-
nition, juries represent a fair cross-section of the community.35 Juries are
chosen in accordance with rules that are designed to ensure that a fair
cross-section of the community is adequately represented and reflected.3 6
21 The United States Supreme Court has conceded the fact that retribution
plays the dominant role in the imposition of the death penalty: "While retribution
clearly plays a more prominent role in the capital case, retribution is an element
of all punishment society imposes... ." Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 462(1984).
428 U.S. 153 (1976).
29 Id. at 183-84 (footnote omitted).
30 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
31 Id. at 155-56.
32 Id. at 156.
3 Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 483 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quot-
ing Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968)).
Mello and Robson, supra note 13, at 49.
- Id.
Gillers, supra note 9, at 63.
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Common sense also dictates that twelve people are more likely than one
to accurately express community values and public sentiment.3 7
In capital cases, the notion that a jury represents a fair cross-section
of the community is subject to a slight qualification. Through the voire
dire process, the prosecution is permitted to challenge for cause any pro-
spective juror who under no circumstances could vote for the imposition
of the death penalty. The United States Supreme Court, in Witherspoon
v. Illinois,38 held that a prospective juror could be challenged for cause if
he or she was "irrevocably committed" to vote against the death penalty
"regardless of the facts and circumstances that might emerge in the course
of the proceedings."3 9 The Court also held that "a prospective juror who
simply 'voiced general objections to' or had 'scruples' against the death
penalty but who was 'willing to consider all of the penalties provided by
state law,' could not be challenged for cause. ' 40 When those prospective
jurors who under no circumstances are able to impose the death penalty
are removed for cause, the resulting jury has been called a "death-qual-
ified" jury.41
In a similar vein, the United States Supreme Court in Lockhart v.
McCree,42 held that a "death-qualified" jury does not unconstitutionally
prejudice the verdict as to the defendant's guilt, nor does it violate the
defendant's rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to an
impartial jury selected from a fair cross-section of the community.43 In so
holding, the Court stated:
It is important to remember that not all who oppose the death
penalty are subject to removal from cause in capital cases; those
who firmly believe that the death penalty is unjust may never-
theless serve as jurors in capital cases so long as they state
clearly that they are willing to temporarily set aside their own
beliefs in deference to the rule of law."
Therefore, the Court concluded that
the Constitution presupposes that a jury selected from a fair
cross-section of the community is impartial, regardless of the
mix of individual viewpoints actually represented in the jury,
so long as the jurors can conscientiously and properly carry out
their sworn duty to apply the law to the facts of the particular
case.
45
37 Id.
-391 U.S. 510 (1968).
19 Id. at 522 n.21.
40 Gillers, supra note 9, at 7 (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. at 522
& n.21).
41 Note, supra note 6, at n. 2. Prospective jurors whose reservations about
capital punishment would prevent or substantially impair them from making an
impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt, or have made it unmistakably clear
that they would never vote for the imposition of capital punishment, are known
as "Witherspoon-excludables." Id. at 1086.
42 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
- Id.
"Id. at 176.
4Id. at 184.
[Vol. 39:605
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Nevertheless, even with the "death-qualification" factor, the role of the
jury in providing a link between contemporary capital punishment and
the community's evolving standards of decency endures. And, in that
regard, the importance of the jury cannot be underestimated. As the Court
has repeatedly stated, "One of the most important functions any jury can
perform in making.., a selection [between life imprisonment and death
for a defendant convicted in a capital case] is to maintain a link between
contemporary community values and the penal system. '48 Stated some-
what differently, the response of the jury is the response of the commu-
nity.4 7
Judges, by contrast, do not speak for the community. Unlike the jury
that is composed of twelve persons, the judge is a solitary person. Thus,
common sense again tells us that one person cannot represent the com-
munity as well as twelve people.4 8 Aside from common sense, judges have
generally differed from the community they represent in terms of race,
sex, economic and social background.49 This is due in part to the statutory
requirements, such as age and education, that must be satisfied before a
person is eligible to become a judge.50
Furthermore, the role of the judge is markedly different from that of
the jury. The role of the judge is not to speak for the community, but to
apply the law to the facts. 51 It is out of the judge's province and duty to
speak for the community. In order for a judge to determine what the
community would say, the judge "must either assess the community's
'belief' or 'conscience' and impose his own or assume it is the commu-
nity's.."5 2 More simply, a judge is a legal scholar, not an ethicist who
effectively evaluates a person's "moral guilt" or where the crime com-
mitted may measure on society's "moral outrage scale.
53
Despite the jury's ability to better reflect the community's conscience,
it has been argued that judicial sentencing will lead to overall greater
sentencing consistency because judges are more experienced in sentencing
than a jury.54 While this argument may have some intuitive appeal, its
underlying reasoning has been debunked. 55 Normally, in non-capital
4 Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 483-84 (1984).
4' Mello and Robson, supra note 13, at 49.
- Gillers, supra note 9, at 63.
49/d.
10Id. at 49.
61 Mello and Robson, supra note 13, at 49.
12 Gillers, supra note 9, at 64.
"Mello and Robson, supra note 13, at 49.
"See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). The Court in Proffitt stated that
"judicial sentencing should lead, if anything, to even greater consistency ... since
a trial judge is more experienced on sentencing than a jury, and therefore better
able to impose sentences similar to those in analogous cases." Id. at 252.
See Gillers, supra note 9, at 59 (examining sentencing in capital cases); Mello
and Robson, supra note 13, at 50.
1991]
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cases, a judge looks to several factors before imposing the sentence. These
factors include: the rate of recidivism for the offense; the frequency with
which the crime is tried; the availability of rehabilitation resources; and
the general sentencing experience culled from his own sentencing ex-
perience and from other judges' sentencing practices for similar of-
fenders." These factors, however, are not applicable in capital cases. Even
if these factors were applicable in capital cases, the actual number of
capital cases over which a single judge presides and utilizes these factors
in imposing a sentence is minute.57
C. The Traditional Role of the Jury as the
Sentencer in Capital Cases
Tradition also lends support to the proposition that juries are better
equipped than judges to impose the sentence in capital cases. As touched
upon in the introduction, the majority of states that allow capital pun-
ishment entrust the sentencing decisions to juries and not judges. Of the
thirty-seven states with capital punishment statutes, thirty-three autho-
rize the jury to determine or recommend the death penalty to the judge.58
And, of these thirty-three states, twenty-nine allow a death sentence only
if the jury recommends death.59 In sum, the proposition that juries are
better equipped to make the sentencing decision in capital cases is amply
supported by history, tradition, and intuition. Further, concomitant to
the death penalty as being "qualitatively" different from other forms of
punishment, history, tradition, and intuition similarly support the prem-
ise that juries are "qualitatively" different from judges in the role of
sentencer in the capital context.
D. Increasing the Risk of Execution by Waiving the Jury.
The decision to waive a jury trial in a capital case theoretically trans-
lates into a decision by the defendant not only to forego the "better"
Gillers, supra note 9, at 57.
67Id. at 58.
Spanziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 463 n.9 (1984).
59 See supra note 13. Even prior to the present day, juries have traditionally
been entrusted with the sentencing decisions in capital cases. In Spaziano v.
Florida, 468 U.S. 447, Justice Stevens traced the history and evolution of capital
punishment in the United States and noted: "[e]xcept for four states that entirely
abolished capital punishment in the middle of the last century, every jurisdiction
has at some time authorized jury sentencing in capital cases." McGautha v. Cal-
ifornia, 402 U.S. 183, 200 n.11 (1971). For example, of 42 jurisdictions that em-
ployed discretionary capital sentencing in 1948, only three did not require its
imposition through jury determinations when the trial judge could not disregard.
At the time of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), only two jurisdictions of
the 41 which employed discretionary capital punishment, permitted a death sen-
tence to be imposed without the consent of the jury. 468 U.S. 447, 472(1984)(Stevens, J. dissenting)(footnotes omitted).
[Vol. 39:605
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sentencing entity but also to sever the invaluable link the jury maintains
in the interposition between the penal system and the community con-
science. Moreover, a decision to waive a jury trial increases the defend-
ant's risk of execution.
In his article Deciding Who Dies, Professor Stephen Gillers delineates
six factors that affect a capital defendant's risk of execution. A capital
defendant's risk of execution is increased by:
(a) excluding information which might have influenced the
sentencer favorably toward the defendant;
(b) telling the sentencer how to weigh the information it cred-
its;
(c) having a judge determine penalty, because judicial sent-
encing has been shown to lead to a greater number of death
sentences than does jury sentencing;
(d) controlling who may sit on the sentencing jury;
(e) if the sentencer is a jury, by manipulating the number of
jurors needed to agree to a particular sentence. This can
vary from requiring death unless the jury is unanimous for
a lessor sentence to requiring a unanimous jury for a sen-
tence of death ....
(f) defining the burdens of production and persuasion of facts
that must be found before death may be imposed or must
be excluded.6
Three of these factors, (c), (d), and (e), are factors of consequence when
a capital defendant waives a trial by jury. First, by waiving a jury, the
capital defendant has chosen to have a judge, as opposed to a jury, de-
termine the penalty. Generally, judges are more inclined to impose the
death penalty than are juries. To illustrate, out of one hundred twenty
cases in which a jury's decision on the penalty has been overridden,
Florida judges have imposed the death penalty in one hundred five of
these cases despite the jury's recommendation of life imprisonment. 61
Similarly, about twenty-two percent of the inmates currently on Alabam-
a's death row are there because the judge overrode the jury's recommen-
dation of life without parole and imposed the death sentence.6 2
- Gillers, supra note 9, at 20-21.
61 Marilyn Milloy, The Death Penalty: Yea or Nay; Florida's Law There to Stay,
NEWSDAY, June 20, 1989, at 5. Florida is a good state to demonstrate the proclivity
of judges that impose the death penalty with greater frequency than the jury
because it is one of three states that allows the judge to override a jury's rec-
ommendation of life imprisonment. See also Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 463 n.9.
62 Marcia Coyle, Counsel's Guiding Hand is Often Handicapped By the System
it Serves Alabama: An Adverse Legislature, Economy, NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL,
June 11, 1990, at 35, col. 3. Like Florida, Alabama is one of three states in which
the jury's verdict in the penalty phase is advisory and the judge is permitted to
override the jury's recommendation of life imprisonment and impose the death
penalty. See also, Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 463 n.9.
1991]
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Another study has confirmed the same result. Out of one hundred eleven
cases in which the crime committed was punishable by death, judges
imposed the death penalty more frequently than juries.6 In eighty-three
cases (74%), the judge would have imposed a prison sentence as compared
to ninety cases (81%) in which the jury would have imposed a prison
sentence." In twenty-eight cases (26%), the judge would have imposed
the death penalty as opposed to twenty-one cases (19%) in which the jury
would have imposed the death sentence.6 5
Once again, this phenomenon can be traced to the qualitative differ-
ences between judges and juries canvassed above. It further lends support
to the proposition that juries rather than judges more accurately depict
community feelings in ascertaining whether or not the appropriate sanc-
tion for the crime committed is death.
Second, when a criminal defendant is tried by a jury, he is entitled to
participate in the selection of jurors through the voir dire procedure.66 By
waiving a trial by jury, the capital defendant has relinquished any lat-
itude, resulting from the voire dire procedure, that he or she possesses in
controlling who may sit on the sentencing jury. Instead, the capital de-
fendant has opted for a judge, a solitary person over which he or she has
no latitude in choosing.
Finally, the decision to waive the right to trial by jury effectively re-
duces the number needed for unanimity from twelve to three or one,
depending upon the state statute. This consequence can be labeled as the
"quantitative" difference between the judge and the jury as the sentencing
entity. It simply is the difference between twelve people as opposed to
three persons or a solitary person deciding on the appropriate penalty.
Currently, unanimity among jury members is required either explicitly
or implicitly before the death penalty may be imposed.67 No state will
allow the imposition of death by a non-unanimous jury.6 Thus, a sole
dissenter out of a twelve member jury will bar the imposition of the death
penalty. Concomitantly, intuition again dictates that as the number of
persons composing a jury increases, the chances that one person will
dissent, thus precluding the imposition of the death penalty, statistically
increase as well.
Consequently, when a jury is waived in favor of a judge or judges, the
probability that one judge will dissent is greatly reduced. Moreover, waiv-
ing a jury in the capital case is more than a simple numerical reduction
of the number needed for unanimity. As discussed above, judges are qual-
itatively different from their counterpart jurors; judges are more prone
to impose the death penalty than jurors.69 As a result, the criminal de-
Gillers, supra note 9, at 67.
4Id.
- Id.
6 See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 704 F.2d 267, 274-75 (6th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Delgado, 635 F.2d 889, 890 (7th Cir. 1981).
61 Gillers, supra note 9, at 89.
,8ld. at 17.69 See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
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fendant has increased the risk of execution not only by reducing the
number needed for unanimity but also by selecting the sentencing entity
from a group that is more inclined to impose the death penalty.
III. THE FEDERAL STANDARD OF A VOLUNTARY, KNOWING
AND INTELLIGENT WAIVER OF TRIAL BY JURY
This section first discusses the federal standard of a voluntary, knowing
and intelligent waiver of trial by jury for two primary reasons. First, the
standard was formulated in the context of the non-capital case in which
the penalty and the role of the jury are substantially less than the coun-
terpart capital case. Second, because the penalty and the role of the jury
is substantially less, the federal standard provides an analytically useful
basis for comparison against the various states' requirements as to what
constitutes a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of trial by jury
in the capital case, highlighting the inadequacies of such standards.
In Johnson v. Zerbst, the United States Supreme Court defined a waiver
of a fundamental constitutional right as being "an intentional relinquish-
ment or abandonment of a known right or privilege."70 The Court went
on to say that it is the trial judge's "serious and weighty responsibility
.. of determining whether there is an intelligent and competent waiver
by the accused. '71 In each case, that determination must depend "upon
the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including
background, experience, and conduct of the accused.
7 2
In Patton v. United States,73 the United States Supreme Court specifi-
cally addressed the issue of waiver of the constitutional right to trial by
jury in criminal cases. The Court, emphasizing the important role of the
jury trial in our system of criminal jurisprudence, stated:
Trial by jury is the normal and, with occasional exceptions, the
preferable mode of disposing of issues of fact in criminal cases
above the grade of petty offenses. In such cases the value and
appropriateness of jury trial have been established by long
experience, and are not now to be denied. Not only must the
right of the accused to a trial by a constitutional jury be jeal-
ously preserved, but the maintenance of the jury as a fact find-
ing body in criminal cases is of such importance and has such
a place in our traditions, that, before any waiver can become
effective, the consent of government counsel and the sanction
of the court must be had, in addition to the express and intel-
ligent consent of the defendant. And the duty of the trial court
in that regard is not to be discharged as a mere matter of rote,
70304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
71 Id. at 465.72 Id. at 464.
73 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
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but with sound and advised discretion, with an eye to avoid
unreasonable or undue departures from that mode of trial or
from any of the essential elements thereof, and with a caution
increasing in degree as the offenses dealt with increase in grav-
ity.74
As both Johnson and the oft-quoted language from Patton illustrate,
the trial court judge plays a crucial role in determining whether a pro-
posed waiver is in fact being offered voluntarily, knowingly, and intel-
ligently; it is a determination that depends upon the unique circumstan-
ces of each case.7 5
Currently, waiver of trial by jury is governed by Federal Rule of Crim-
inal Procedure 23(a), 6 a codification of both the holding and dicta em-
bodied in Patton v. United States.7 7 Thus, in order for a defendant to waive
his or her right to trial by jury, four requirements must be satisfied: (1)
the waiver must be in writing; (2) the government must consent to the
waiver; (3) the trial court must accept the waiver; and (4) the waiver
must be made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.78 As noted above,
the trial court judge bears the responsibility of insuring that the defend-
ant's decision to waive the right to trial by jury is voluntary, knowing,
and intelligent. Consequently, the trial court judge must first assess the
defendant's mental ability to make an intelligent decision along with the
defendant's awareness of the burdens and benefits of electing to forego a
jury trial. 79 The defendant must demonstrate some knowledge of the jury
trial right prior to the trial court's approval of the waiver.8 0 A defendant
ignorant of the nature of the jury trial right cannot intelligently weigh
the value of that right as well as its commensurate safeguards.,' More-
over, in light of Patton's pronouncement that trial by jury is the consti-
tutionally preferred means of disposition of the criminal case, the trial
court bears substantial responsibility for jealously preserving the jury
trial.8
2
Heeding Patton's call that the validity of waiver is "not to be discharged
as a mere matter of rote, but [rather] with sound and advised discretion,"8 3
74 1d. at 312-13.5 Adams v. U.S. ex rel McCann, 317 U.S. 269,278 (1942). Cf. Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) ("The determination of whether there has been an
intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the
particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the back-
ground, experience and conduct of the accused.")
76 Rule 23(a) provides: 'Trial by jury cases required to be tried by jury shall
be so tried unless the defendant waives a jury trial in writing with the approval
of the court and the consent of the government." FED. R. CRiM. P. 23(a).
77 John Feldman, Comment, Singer v. United States and the Misapprehended
Source of the Non-Consensual Bench Trial, 51 U. Cm. L. REv. 222, 224 (1984)
71 United States v. Cochran, 770 F.2d 850, 851 (9th Cir. 1985).
71 United States v. Martin, 704 F.2d 267, 272 (6th Cir. 1983).
80 Id. at 273.
81 Id.
"I Id. at 272.
81 Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
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the various federal circuit courts have suggested that the trial courts
should conduct colloquies with the defendant on the record to insure that
the defendant understands the right to trial by jury and the consequences
of the decision to waive that right:
8 4
It is the better practice for a district judge when advised by a
defendant that he desires to waive his right to a jury trial, to
interrogate the defendant so as to satisfy himself that the de-
fendant is fully apprised of his rights and freely and voluntarily
desires to relinquish them. Such an interrogation would pro-
vide the district judge with an additional factual basis on which
to grant or withhold his approval of the waiver.8 5
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Martin stated that "[w]e
implore the district courts to personally inform each defendant of the
benefits and burdens of jury trials on the record prior to accepting a
proffered waiver.."
86
Substantively, the courts have repeatedly stated that during this col-
loquy, the defendant, at a minimum, should be informed that a jury is
composed of twelve members of the community; that the defendant may
participate in the selection of the jurors; that the verdict of the jury must
be unanimous; and that ajudge alone will decide guilt or innocence should
the defendant waive the right to trial by jury. 7
See, e.g., United States v. Cochran, 770 F.2d 850, 852 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Trial
courts should conduct colloquies with the defendant before accepting a waiver of
the right to jury trial.") (emphasis in original); United States v. Anderson, 704
F.2d 117, 119 (3rd Cir. 1983) ("We believe that a colloquy between the district
judge and the defendant is preferable to the mere acceptance by the court of the
written waiver and the filing of it in the record of the case."); United States v.
Scott, 583 F.2d 362 (7th Cir. 1978) ("The preferable procedure is to interrogate
the defendant on the subject of waiver .. ."); United States v. David, 511 F.2d
355, 361 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("Trial judges would be well-advised to directly question
the defendant in all cases to determine the validity of any proffered waiver of
jury trial.")
, United States v. Cochran, 770 F.2d 850, 852 (9th Cir. 1985) (quoting United
States v. Hunt, 413 F.2d 983, 984 (4th Cir. 1969)).
" United States v. Martin, 704 F.2d 267, 274 (6th Cir. 1983).
B7 See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 704 F.2d 267, 274 (6th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Cochran, 770 F.2d 850, 853 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Delgado,
635 F.2d 889, 890 (7th Cir. 1981).
In United States v. Anderson, the court made reference to the BENCH BOOK
FOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGES as containing a suggested colloquy
and urged the district courts to follow those procedures outlined in the book
whenever practicable. 704 F.2d 117, 119 (3rd Cir. 1983). The following is an
excerpt taken from that book:
Preliminary Questions for Defendant
1. The court is informed that you desire to waiver your right to a jury trial.
Is that correct?
2. Before accepting your waiver to a jury trial, there are a number of
questions I will ask you to assure that it is a valid waiver. If you do not
understand any of the questions or at any time wish to interrupt the pro-
ceeding to consult further with your attorney, please say so, since it is
essential to a valid waiver that you understand each question before you
answer. Do you understand?
1991]
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The Seventh Circuit has gone one step beyond the exhortation of the
other circuit courts and has made an interrogation of the defendant man-
datory before a district court judge accepts a waiver of a jury trial.88
Therefore, subsequent to the implementation of this rule, the failure to
interrogate the defendant has led to ipso facto reversal on appeal.8 9
3. What is your full true name?
4. How old are you?
5. How far did you go in school?
6. What is your employment background?
7. Have you taken any drugs, medicine, or pills, or drunk any alcoholic
beverage in the past 24 hours?
8. Do you understand that you are entitled to a trial by jury on the charges
filed against you?
9. Do you understand that a jury trial means that you are tried by a jury
consisting of 12 people and that all the jurors must agree on the verdict?
10. Do you understand that you have a right to participate in the selection
of the jury?
11. Do you understand that if I approve your waiver of a jury trial, the
court will try the case and determine your innocence or guilt?
12. Have you discussed with your attorney your right to a jury trial?
13. Have you discussed with your attorney the advantages and disadvan-
tages of a jury trial? Do you want to discuss it further with your attorney?
Questions of Counsel
In determining whether the accused has made a 'knowing and voluntary'
waiver and is competent to waive, inquiry should be made of both defense
counsel and the prosecutor.
Defense Counsel
1. Have you discussed with the defendant the advantages and disadvan-
tages of a jury trial?
2. Do you have any doubt that the defendant is making a 'knowing and
voluntary' waiver of the right to a jury trial?
3. Has anything come to your attention which suggests a question as to
the defendant's competence to waive a jury trial?
Prosecutor
Has anything come to your attention which suggests a question as to the
defendant's competence to waive a jury trial?
Form of Waiver and Oral Finding
A written waiver of a jury trial must be signed by the defendant, approved
by the attorney for the defendant, consented to by the government, and
approved by the court. It is suggested that the court orally find as follows:
That defendant has knowledge and voluntarily waived his right to a jury
trial and I approve the waiver.
BENCH BOOK FOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGES § 1.12-3-5 (3rd ed. 1986).
m United States v. Scott, 583 F.2d 362, 364 (7th Cir. 1978).
0 See, e.g., United States v. Delgado, 635 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1981). In this case,
the following colloquy occurred between the court and the defendant, leading to
a reversal because the inquiry made by the trial court was insufficient.
THE COURT: This is your signature on here, Mr. Delgado?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Mr. Haas read it to you?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: You voluntarily give up your right to a trial by jury, is that
correct?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Is that also on advice of your attorney?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
Id. at 890.
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Such an interrogation, whether performed subject to an imploration or
a mandatory requirement, serves three efficacious purposes. First, by
engaging in a colloquy with the defendant, the trial judge is in a better
position to ascertain whether the defendant knows what the right to trial
by jury guarantees and the consequences of waiver, thus ensuring that
the waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.90 Second, it promotes
judicial economy by avoiding challenges to the validity of waivers on
appeal or through habeas corpus proceedings, 91 enhancing the finality of
convictions.9 2 Third, because of the importance of the right to jury trial,
it emphasizes the seriousness of the decision to the defendant.9 3 Fur-
thermore, retrospective challenges made by the defendant questioning
the validity of a waiver have proven futile.
9 4
In short, engaging in a colloquy with the defendant is in reality a simple
procedure. The benefits derived from such a procedure substantially out-
weigh any burdens associated with it. As the court in United States v.
Cochran incisively stated, "There is, thus every reason for district court
judges to conduct a colloquy before accepting a waiver of the right to trial
by jury and no apparent reason for not doing so."'
IV. THE STATES' STANDARDS OF A VOLUNTARY, KNOWING, AND
INTELLIGENT WAIVER OF TRIAL BY JURY
With the federal procedures, formulated in the non-capital context out-
lined above, this section discusses the disparity among the states as to
what constitutes a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver of a jury
trial in the capital context. Unlike the non-capital case, the decision to
waive a jury trial in a capital case entails substantially much more than
a superficial substitution of judge for jury as the arbiter of guilt or in-
nocence. As discussed in section two, the death penalty is unique in many
respects-its severity and irrevocability, the role the jury plays as sen-
tencer in the majority of the states and in the interposition between the
penal system and the community's evolving standards of decency. Thus,
given these unique aspects of the death penalty, this section argues that
the capital defendant is not sufficiently informed by the trial court of
these aspects to make a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of
the right to trial by jury.
Another important point that must be borne in mind with respect to a
capital jury trial waiver is the Court's statement in Patton v. United
States9" that the trial court's determination of a defendant's intelligent
No United States v. Cochran, 770 F.2d 850, 852 (9th Cir. 1985).
D Id.
91 United States v. Martin, 704 F.2d 267, 274 (6th Cir. 1983).
United States v. Cochran, 770 F.2d 850, 852 (9th Cir. 1985).
'Id.
Isd.
281 U.S. 276 (1930).
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consent to waiver should not be "discharged as a matter of rote, but with
sound and advised discretion.., and with a caution increasing in degree
as the offenses dealt with increase in gravity. '97 Accordingly, because the
death penalty is the appropriate sanction to only the most serious offenses,
a logical application of Patton's reasoning would indicate that the colloquy
between the trial court and defendant should contain substantially more
than the colloquy performed during a non-capital waiver. Yet, in actuality,
the courts vary widely as to the sufficiency of a voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent waiver.
As the previous section illustrated, the federal courts, either pursuant
to exhortation or mandatory requirement, engage in a colloquy with the
defendant. Through the colloquy, the defendant is informed that a jury
is composed of twelve members of the community; that the defendant
may participate in the selection of the jurors; that the verdict must be
unanimous; and that the judge alone will decide guilt or innocence should
the defendant waive the right to trial by jury.98 By stark comparison,
some states do not require a colloquy between the trial court and the
defendant. In those states that have a colloquy-type requirement, the
capital defendant is not sufficiently informed of the nature and function
of a jury to make a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver.
In Kennedy v. State," the defendant contested the validity of his jury
trial waiver. The defendant asserted that his waiver was not entered
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently because he was uninformed as
to the differences between a trial by the court and a trial by jury. 00 In
the former, for example, the court does not judge the credibility of the
witnesses or weigh conflicting evidence.10'
The defendant grounded his assertion on the holdings of Johnson v.
Zerbst'0 2 and Brady v. United States.03 In Johnson v. Zerbst, the United
States Supreme Court held that the trial court has a duty to determine
whether there is an intelligent and competent waiver of the accused's
right to counsel. 0 4 In Brady v. United States, the Court similarly held
that the record must affirmatively demonstrate that the accused volun-
tarily, knowingly, and intelligently entered the plea of guilty. 10 5 The de-
Id. at 312-13 (emphasis added).
98 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
"393 N.E.2d 139 (Ind. 1979).
100 The following constituted the entire colloquy between the trial court and
the defendant:
THE COURT: Is that correct with you, Mr. Kennedy, you wish to waive
trial by jury and have the trial just by myself, is that correct?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
Id. at 142.
:01 Id.
102 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
103 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
'"304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938).
'"397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
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fendant argued that these holdings were applicable to the waiver of the
right to trial by jury.' The Indiana Supreme Court rejected the defend-
ant's assertion by distinguishing these cases in view of the fact that the
former involved the accused's right to counsel and the latter involved the
accused's plea of guilty.10 7 The court thus held that there is "no parallel
statutory or constitutional requirement that the trial judge explain the
differences between a trial by the court and by jury or is there any re-
quirement that defendant understand the difference."10 8 In actuality, the
court, by distinguishing the right to trial by jury from the right to counsel
or the rights waived when a plea of guilty is entered, belied the very
essence of the right to trial by jury-namely, that it is a constitutional
right. And, as a constitutional right, a waiver "not only must be voluntary
but must be [a] knowing, intelligent act[] done with sufficient awareness
of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences."'1 9 Therefore, the
interrogation of a defendant during a plea of guilty or waiver of the right
to counsel is equally applicable to a waiver of trial by jury.
The court also cited the Seventh Circuit's holding in United States v.
Scott 1" for further support that an interrogation of the defendant before
accepting a jury trial waiver is not required by the Sixth Amendment.
Ironically, it was the Scott decision from which burgeoned the Seventh
Circuit's formal adoption of a mandatory requirement that federal courts
interrogate the accused to ensure that he or she understands the right
to a jury trial and the consequences of a waiver."'
Recently, the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Jells"2 addressed a capital
defendant's similar contention that his waiver of trial by jury was not
made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. The defendant argued
that the trial judge should have conducted a more thorough inquiry before
accepting the waiver." 3 In rejecting this contention, the court stated that
10 Kennedy v. State, 393 N.E.2d 139, 142 (Ind. 1979).
107 Id.
108 Id.
l09 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
110 583 F.2d 362 (7th Cir. 1978).
" See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
112 559 N.E.2d 464 (Ohio 1990).
113 Id. at 467. The defendant and trial judge engaged in the following colloquy:
THE COURT: Reginald, is that your signature?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, it is, sir.
THE COURT: You did this of your own free will?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I did.
THE COURT: Nobody forced you to do this?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. HUBBARD [defense counsel]: I have witnessed his signature Your
Honor.
THE COURT: This will be made part of the record.
Id. at 468. In United States v. Delgado, a similar type colloquy between the judge
and defendant was held to be insufficient, warranting reversal. 635 F.2d 889, 890
(7th Cir. 1981). See supra note 72 for this colloquy.
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there is no requirement for the trial court to interrogate the defendant
to ascertain whether he or she is fully apprised of the right to a jury trial,
although the court conceded that this may be the better practice." 4 The
court found no error in this case because the waiver complied with both
the requirements of the Ohio Criminal Rules'1 5 and the Ohio Revised
Code. 1 6 Thus, the court concluded that the waiver was voluntarily, know-
ingly, and intelligently entered. 1 7
While the Ohio Supreme Court may have correctly concluded that the
procedures followed in Jells were constitutionally sufficient, such a pro-
cedure nevertheless fails to adequately inform the defendant of the im-
plications of a waiver needed for a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent
waiver. For example, the waiver form signed by the defendant governs
both non-capital and capital cases." 8 Thus, at the outset, the waiver form
fails to take into consideration the unique aspects of a death penalty case
114 State v. Jells, 559 N.E.2d 464, 468 (Ohio 1990). Like Ohio, Florida does not
require a personal, on-the-record colloquy with the defendant for a waiver to be
effective. See, e.g., State v. Griffith, 561 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 1990). The court stated:
Although we expressly hold that the trial court did not have an affirmative
duty to make a record inquiry concerning Griffith's waiver of a trial by a
twelve-person jury, when a defense waiver is required as to any aspect or
proceeding of a trial, it would be the better procedure for the trial court to
make an inquiry of the defendant and to have the waiver appear on the
record. The matter would thus be laid to rest and preclude any appeal or
postconviction claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Id. at 530-31 n.5.
By contrast, the court in Walker v. State, 578 P.2d 1388, (Ala. 1978), stated
that "[w]e believe that waiver of the right to trial by a jury of twelve persons
requires that the court personally address the defendant, and that failure to do
so is error per se." Id. at 1389-90. Similarly, Pennsylvania Criminal Procedure
Rule 1101 requires an on-the-record colloquy that indicates the accused "knew
the essential ingredients of a jury trial which are necessary to understand the
significance of the right he was waiving." Commonwealth v. Candia, 428 A.2d
993, 995 (Pa. 1981).
11 Rule 23(A) of the Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in pertinent
part: "In serious offense cases the defendant before commencement of the trial
may knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waive in writing his right to trial
by jury." Omo R. CRIm. P. 23(A).
" Ohio Revised Code § 2945.05 provides:
In all criminal cases pending in courts of record in this state, the defendant
may waive a trial by jury and be tried by the court without a jury. Such
waiver by a defendant, shall be in writing, signed by the defendant, and
filed in said cause and made a part of the record thereof. It shall be entitled
in the court and cause, and in substance as follows: "I -, defendant in
the above cause, hereby voluntarily waive and relinquish my right to a
trial by jury, and elect to be tried by a Judge of the Court in which the said
cause may be pending. I fully understand that under the laws of this state,
I have a constitutional right to a trial by jury." Such waiver of trial by jury
must be made in open court after the defendant has been arraigned and
has had opportunity to consult with counsel. Such waiver may be withdrawn
by the defendant at any time before the commencement of the trial.
Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.05 (Baldwin 1990).
11 State v. Jells, 559 N.E. 2d 464, 468 (Ohio 1990).
18 See OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.05 (Baldwin 1990).
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that sets it apart from a non-capital case. 119 In Ohio, a person who is
accused of an offense punishable by death and elects to waive a jury trial
will then be tried by a panel of three judges as opposed to one judge 120 as
the waiver form seems to indicate.
12
'
More importantly, the defendant is also not apprised of the basic nature
and role of the jury. For example, in contrast to the federal procedure,
an Ohio capital defendant is not informed that a jury is composed of
twelve members of the community, and that in order to be convicted, the
verdict of the jury must be unanimous. Not only does the Ohio procedure
fail to comport with the suggested procedure followed by the federal courts
in the non-capital context, but it also fails to adequately inform the de-
fendant of the more significant role of the jury in a capital case and the
implications stemming from a waiver.
In Ohio, the jury is entrusted with the task of weighing the aggravating
circumstances and mitigating factors. 22 If all twelve members unani-
mously find that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
factors, the jury must recommend the sentence of death. 123 This recom-
I19 In contrast, Arizona's waiver form does distinguish the death penalty from
other proceedings and provides the defendant with some knowledge of the role
the jury plays in imposing the sentence. It provides in pertinent part.
WAIVER OF TRIAL BY JURY
Instructions: The purpose of this form is to advise you of your right to trial
by jury and to allow you to give up that right if you so choose. Read the
entire form carefully before signing it.
RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY
I understand that I am charged with the crime of which
is a [misdemeanor] [felony] under the law of Arizona and that if I am found
guilty I can be given a severe punishment, including [imprisonment] [in
the Arizona State Prison], [in the County Jail], [by a fine],
or other penalty.
I understand that I am entitled to a trial by jury on these charges, and that
the right to jury means the right to have my guilt or innocence decided by
a group of ordinary people whose decision must be unanimous. I understand
that in cases in which the death penalty may be imposed, if the case is tried
to a jury, it is the jury which must fix the punishment at life or death but
if there is no jury the judge makes that decision....
ARIz. R. CRim. P. Form XX. Also, the trial court judge must address the
defendant personally to ascertain if the waiver is knowing, voluntary, and in-
telligent. Rule 18.1(b)(1) states in pertinent part that "[b]efore accepting a waiver
the court shall address the defendant personally, advise him of his right to a jury
trial and ascertain that the waiver is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent." ARiz.
R. CRim. P. § 18.1(b)(1).
20 Section 2945.06 of the Ohio Revised Code provides in pertinent part: "If the
accused is charged with an offense punishable with death, he shall be tried by a
court to be composed of three judges,....
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.06 (Baldwin 1986).
121 Section 1.43(A) of the Ohio Revised Code states that "[t]he singular includes
the plural, and the plural includes the singular." OHmo REVISED CODE ANN.
§ 1.43(A) (Baldwin 1990). While an attorney may be familiar with this provision,
a criminal defendant cannot reasonably be expected to be cognizant of it, thus
bringing to light the inadequacies of the waiver procedure.
122 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03 (D)(2) (Baldwin 1986).
123 Id.
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mendation, however, is only advisory and not binding upon the court.
The final decision as to whether the death penalty shall be imposed is
bestowed upon the trial court judge.124 On the other hand, if the jury is
unable to unanimously find that the aggravating circumstances outweigh
the mitigating factors, the jury must recommend either of two possible
life imprisonment sentences. 25 This particular recommendation is bind-
ing upon the court,126 and, unlike Alabama, Florida, and Indiana, the
trial court cannot override the jury's recommendation of a life sentence
by imposing a death sentence.
127
124 Id. at (D)(3)
1210 Ohio Revised Code Section 2929.03(D)(2) provides:
Upon consideration of the relevant evidence raised at trial, the testimony,
other evidence, statement of the offender, arguments of counsel, and, if
applicable, the reports submitted pursuant to division (D)(1) of this section,
the trial jury, if the offender was tried by a jury, shall determine whether
the aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing
are sufficient to outweigh the mitigating factors present in the case. If the
trial jury unanimously finds, by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing
outweigh the mitigating factors, the trial jury shall recommend to the court
that the sentence of death be imposed on the offender. Absent such a finding,
the jury shall recommend that the offender be sentenced to life imprison-
ment with parole eligibility after serving twenty full years of imprisonment
or to life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving thirty full years
of imprisonment. If the trial jury recommends that the offender be sen-
tenced to life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving twenty full
years of imprisonment or to life imprisonment with parole eligibility after
serving thirty full years of imprisonment, the court shall impose the sen-
tence recommended by the jury upon the offender. If the trial jury recom-
mends that the sentence of death be imposed upon the offender, the court
shall proceed to impose sentence pursuant to division (D)(3) of this section.
Oaio REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03 (D)(2)-(3) (Baldwin 1986).
128 Id.
1
27 See supra note 12. Tactically, in Ohio, why would an attorney advise his/
het client to waive? A jury's recommendation that the defendant be sentenced to
death is only advisory whereas a recommendation of life imprisonment is binding
upon the court and thus must be followed. In section one of this Note, I demon-
strated that judges are more apt to impose the death penalty than are juries. See
supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text. Therefore, a decision to waive a jury
increases a defendant's risk of execution. Moreover, even if the jury recommends
the death sentence, a judge is not required to follow such a recommendation and
may reduce the penalty to less than death. Yet, a jury's recommendation for life
imprisonment, which is more likely to occur if the jury is the sentencer as opposed
to judge, must be followed by the judge. The judge is not empowered to overrule
a recommendation for life imprisonment and impose a death sentence.
A defendant who does not waive a jury trial is able to take advantage of the
jury's tendency to impose life imprisonment as opposed to a death sentence. The
defendant still retains the chance that the judge will not impose a death sentence
should the jury's recommendation be the penalty of death. Conversely, a decision
to forego a trial by jury is a decision to relinquish two chances, the judge and
jury, for a sentence of life imprisonment.
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Knowledge of the factors that compose a state's capital sentencing
scheme is an essential prerequisite to a voluntary, knowing, and intel-
ligent waiver of trial by jury. These factors weigh heavily upon any ra-
tional defendant's decision to forego a jury trial. For example, all states
that allow capital punishment either implicitly or explicitly require un-
animity before a sentence of death can be imposed. 128 Therefore, if one
juror refuses to agree on the death penalty, its imposition is precluded. 129
As a corollary, common sense indicates that it is much easier to persuade
one out of twelve persons not to impose the death penalty as opposed to
persuading one out of three persons or one person sitting in judgment
not to do so. As a result, a defendant's chances of receiving the death
penalty statistically diminish if he asserts his right to trial by jury. More-
over, given the structure of Ohio's capital sentencing scheme, the per-
suasion of one juror that the penalty shall not be death is a profound
significance to the defendant. Therefore, knowledge of the unanimity
requirement and the binding effect of a non-unanimous jury that the
penalty will be life imprisonment instead of death is essential for the
defp'tdant to make a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver.
In a dissenting opinion from denial of certiorari, Justice Marshall, with
whom Justice Brennan joined, addressed the issue ofjuror unanimity and
its effect upon a defendant's waiver decision in Robertson v. California.10
Calling t *- issue one of "profound constitutional significance," Justice
Marshall questioned "whether the defendant's waiver of his right to [trial
by] jury in a capital sentencing proceeding is [in fact] voluntary, knowing,
and intelligent when no evidence indicates that [the defendant] was aware
of a [California] statute requiring the court to impose a life sentence if
the sentencing jury failed to reach a unanimous decision."''31 The statute
at issue in Robertson stated that "[i]f the trier of fact is a jury and has
been unable to reach a unanimous verdict as to what the penalty shall
be, the court shall dismiss the jury and impose a punishment of confine-
ment in state prision for life without the possibility of parole.'
3 2
- See supra notes 58 and 59 and accompanying text.
129 Yet, despite the importance of unanimity in a capital proceeding, Illinois
courts have consistently declined to require that the defendant be made aware
that a unanimous verdict is needed for the imposition of the death penalty. See,
e.g., People v. Ashford, 520 N.E.2d 332 (Ill. 1988) cert. denied, 488 U.S. 900 (1988);
People v. Eyler, 549 N.E.2d 268 (Ill. 1989) cert. denied 111 S. Ct. 215 (1990);
People v. Ruiz, 547 N.E.2d 170 (Ill. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2632 (1990).
's 493 U.S. 879 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
131 Id.
132 1977 CAL. STATS., ch. 316, § 12. Currently, a similar provision to the 1977
statute is found in the California Penal Code at Section 190.4(b):
If defendant was convicted by the court sitting without a jury, the trier
of fact at the penalty hearing shall be a jury unless a jury is waived by the
defendant and the people, in which case the trier of fact shall be the court.
If the defendant was convicted by a plea of guilty, the trier of fact shall be
a jury unless a jury is waived by the defendant and the people.
If the trier of fact is a jury and has been unable to reach a unanimous
verdict as to what the penalty shall be, the court shall dismiss the jury and
shall order a new jury impaneled to try the issue as to what the penalty
1991]
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At no time during the colloquy' 33 with the defendant did the trial judge
read or paraphrase the jury deadlock provision.13 4 The defendant con-
shall be. If such new jury is unable to reach a unanimous verdict as to what
the penalty shall be, the court in its discretion shall either order a new jury
or impose a punishment of confinement in state prison for a term of life
without the possibility of parole.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(b) (West 1985).
13 Before a waiver is accepted by the court in California, the court must per-
sonally address the defendant. Rule 18.1(b)(1) states in pertinent part that "before
accepting a waiver the court shall address the defendant personally, advise him
of his right to a jury trial and ascertain that the waiver is knowing, voluntary,
and intelligent." CAL. R. Cram. P. 18.1(b)(1).
- Robertson v. California, 493 U.S. 879 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting). The
following excerpts were taken from the colloquy between the court and the de-
fendant:
THE COURT: Mr. Robertson, under the law you do have a right to waive
your right to jury. Of course, the District Attorney has a right to a jury
trial, too. Before the Court can accept it, it will require a waiver from the
District Attorney's office, also. Under the law the Court, although you have
the right to do that, the Court is required to make inquiry of you to be sure
that it is a knowing and intelligent waiver before the Court can consent to
it. So, I am going to go through some questions which have been provided
to me by the District Attorney as a condition of their consenting to waive
the jury, also, and I want to discuss this with you very briefly.
You understand that your position of dire or severe jeopardy in the re-
hearing of your trial's penalty phase will not be reduced by the fact you are
choosing a court trial rather than a jury trial; do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: You also understand that you should be aware that you are
in exactly the same jeopardy regardless of the method of trial which you
personally will choose? Your position will not be altered in any degree.
Neither the evidence nor the legally appropriate outcome dictated by the
evidence will be altered, only the avenue of your alternate sentencing will
be changed in any way; do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: You understand, also, that if you do waive jury and submit
it to the Court, the Court will act solely. If you have a jury trial, before a
verdict can be returned either way, it requires unanimous agreement of all
12 jurors; do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And understanding that you still wish to waive and give up
your right to have a jury?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: You understand that my personal philosophy, if any, con-
cerning [the] death penalty will not affect or interfere with my evaluation
of the evidence or application of the law; do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: In other words, you, by waiving your right to a jury trial,
are doing so with the awareness that the Court will behave as a jury, a jury
that has sworn that it will sentence you to death if appropriate under the
law and the evidence; do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And the other side of that, of course, is that the Court will
sentence you to life in prison without the possibility of parole if the Court
finds, after reviewing all the evidence, that that is appropriate under the
law and the evidence; you understand that, also?
(Vol. 39:605
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tended that the court's failure to do so was in error, warranting a reversal
of the death sentence.13
5
The California Supreme Court rejected this contention by presuming
that the defendant's counsel had informed the defendant of the effect of
a jury deadlock. 116 In response, Justice Marshall stated:
[A] presumption that defendant's counsel will always inform
him of the relevant factors in a decision to waive constitutional
rights amounts to a rule that all waivers made after the de-
fendant has retained counsel necessarily will be considered vol-
untary, knowing, and intelligent. Such a rule offends common
sense and impermissibly strips a defendant of constitutional
protections long recognized by this court.
13 7
Justice Marshall further remarked that a presumption that a defendant
is familiar with the respective state's capital sentencing law, and in par-
ticular, the effect of a jury deadlock is especially inappropriate in a capital
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: You understand that by waiving your right to a jury trial
on the issue of your penalty and by a requesting a court trial you are not
lessening, reducing or eliminating the possibility of your penalty being set
at death if the evidence supports such a penalty; do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: You understand that by waiving your right to jury trial you
are not receiving any promises from anyone, either express or implied, of
leniency or special consideration; do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Having been made aware of the Court's legal obligations and
the Court's planned course of conduct required by the law, is it your desire
to give up your right to a jury trial on the issue of your penalty and request
a court trial?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: In making your decision to waive your rights to a jury trial,
has anyone made any direct or implied threats to you?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
THE COURT: Or has anybody made any direct or implied promises to you?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
THE COURT: In making your decision to waive your right to a jury trial,
do you believe that you have received any kind of pressure from anyone?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
THE COURT: Is your decision to waive your right to a jury trial freely and
voluntarily made?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And do you have any questions concerning your waiver?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
THE COURT: I take it counsel again join with the defendant in the waiver?
MR. WELCH: Counsel joins, yes, Your Honor.
(quoted from People v. Robertson, 767 P.2d at 1117 n.5, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 879
(1989).
13 Robertson v. California, 493 U.S. 879, 880 (1989).
136 Id. at 1117, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. at 217.
13 Robertson v. California, 110 S. Ct. 216, 217 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(emphasis in original).
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proceeding. As an illustration, a "hung jury" does not result in a mistrial,
the traditional result in a non-capital proceeding, but rather the auto-
matic imposition of a certain penalty. 138 In the majority of states that
have statutes imposing the death penalty, a jury's failure to unanimously
agree on the death penalty results in the automatic imposition of a penalty
less than death. 139 Therefore, informing a defendant of the peculiar ram-
ifications of a jury deadlock on a defendant's sentence "is plainly relevant,
if not central, to a rational defendant's choice between being sentenced
by a judge or a jury."140
Despite the importance of the unanimity requirement and the effect
that a non-unanimous jury has upon a defendant's sentence, courts have
stated that a defendant need not be informed that a unanimous verdict
is needed for the imposition of the death penalty.1 4 ' In People v. Ruiz,'
4
2
a capital defendant asserted that his waiver of the right to trial by jury
at the sentencing phase of his trial was not voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent because he was not informed of the non-unanimity rule-to
wit, that the favorable vote of a single juror will preclude the imposition
of the death penalty.143 The Supreme Court of Illinois rejected the de-
138 Id.
13
9 See generally, Gillers supra note 9, at 101-19 (Appendix I showing judge's
power if jury does not agree unanimously on sentence).
1- 110 S. Ct. at 218 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
'4 See supra note 121.
142 547 N.E.2d 170 (111. 1989).
1' Id. at 178. The Illinois jury waiver statute provides: "Every person accused
of an offense shall have the right to a trial by jury unless understandingly waived
by the defendant in open court." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch 38, para. 103-6 (Smith-Hurd
1985). In Ruiz, the following colloquy was engaged in between the trial court and
the defendant:
MR. GREEN [defense counsel]: We are going to waive the jury and submit
the cause to the court, but I ask the matter be continued for a week.
THE COURT: I want to make sure your client understands what he's doing.
Do you understand that the provisions of the act at this time, first two
questions, are left, Number one, whether this case would fit under the death
provisions of the Illinois Statute and number two, whether you should be
entitled to the penalty of death in the State of Illinois.
This can be decided by this jury or you may waive your right to this jury
and have the Court, and the Court alone decide whether it should be imposed
or not, meaning that I alone will have that responsibility. Do you understand
that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Do you wish to waive your right to a jury trial as far as this
is concerned, and have the court and the Court alone decide whether the
death penalty should be imposed or not?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: This you discussed with your attorney before?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes sir.
THE COURT: Do you understand that this is a Constitutional right that
is guaranteed to you, do you understand that sir?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Let the record show that he has signed the waiver in open
court.
People v. Ruiz, 547 N.E.2d 170, 178 (Ill. 1989).
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fendant's assertion that his waiver was not voluntary, knowing, and in-
telligent by stating that "[w]e have in the past declined to impose a
requirement that a defendant be expressly advised of the non-unanimity
rule-that the favorable vote of a single juror will preclude the imposition
of the death penalty-as a condition of a valid jury waiver at a capital
sentencing hearing."1 " The Ruiz Court further stated that there is not
"a requirement that the trial judge advise a defendant that the jury's
decision to impose the death penalty must be unanimous.'
1 45
Illinois courts have also held that waiver of the right to a jury trial is
valid.where the accused permits his attorney in his presence and without
objection to expressly advise the court of the client's decision to waive
the jury trial. 14 The courts have presumed that when the attorney informs
the court of the client's waiver decision, the client has knowingly and
understandably consented to the waiver and its implications. 147 But, as
Justice Marshall remarked in Robertson v. California, such a presumption
"offends common sense."' 48
In comparison to the procedures followed by the courts cited above,
some courts have adopted better approaches. For example, the court in
Harris v. State149 held that the court must explain the effect of a jury
deadlock provision in order for a waiver to be effective. 15 ° The provision
at issue in this case stated that "[i]f the jury, within a reasonable time,
is not able to agree as to sentence, the court shall dismiss the jury and
impose a sentence of imprisonment for life."'15 The defendant contended
that the trial court's failure to inform him of this provision left him
unaware of what he was relinquishing, and therefore could not make a
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver. Specifically, the defendant
contended that "he gave up a sentencing proceeding where unanimity
would be required for death, but only one holdout would result in the
imposition of a life sentence. 1 152 The Maryland Court of Appeals agreed
with this contention. The court stated that "[ilt is not difficult to see how
this additional information [the effect ofjury deadlock] may very well be
14Id. at 179.
145Id.
'46 See, e.g., People v. Spain, 415 N.E.2d 456 (Ill. 1980); People v. Rynberk, 415
N.E.2d 1087 (Ill. 1980).
147 People v. Morgan, 492 N.E.2d 1303 (Ill. 1986).
148 Robertson v. California, 110 S. Ct. 216, 217 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
149 455 A.2d 979 (Md. 1983).
110 Id. at 984. Maryland also requires a colloquy with the defendant before a
waiver of a jury trial is accepted. Rule 4-246(b), derived from former Rule 735(b)
provides:
[A] defendant may waive the right to a trial by jury at any time before the
commencement of trial. The court may not accept the waiver until it de-
termines, after an examination of the defendant on the record in open court
conducted by the court, the State's Attorney, the Attorney for the defendant,
or any combination thereof, that the waiver is made knowingly and vol-
untarily.
MD. R. CRim. P. 4-246(b).
I'l Harris v. State, 455 A.2d 979, 984 (Md. 1983).
"F2 Id. at 984.
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significant to one convicted of first degree murder and facing a possible
sentence of death. We believe this information should have been given
to the [defendant]. '15 3
A similar result was achieved by the Supreme Court of South Carolina
in State v. Arthur.1 54 Once again, the defendant challenged the validity
of his jury trial waiver on the grounds that it was not entered voluntarily,
knowingly, or intelligently. During the entire colloquy with the defend-
ant, the court only asked the defendant if he consented to have a judge
try the case rather than a jury without explaining the differences between
a trial by jury and a trial by the court. 55 The court stated that none of
the questions propounded to the defendant were of the nature to elicit a
meaningful response. The court also failed to inform the defendant of
"the essential ingredients of a jury trial which are necessary to under-
stand the significance of the right he was waiving.156 The court, therefore,
held that an acceptance of a jury trial waiver must be based upon a written
record that clearly demonstrates that the waiver was made voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently; such can only be accomplished through a
searching interrogation of the accused by the trial court itself."'5 7
The court further warned against a court's acceptance of a waiver based
upon a defendant's statement that his attorney advised him of the con-
sequences of the waiver before the waiver was proffered, without first
conducting its own direct interrogation of the defendant. To do so, "simply
underscores the peril inherent in the acceptance of waivers by criminal
defendants. [A] peril [that] is manifestly enhanced where the charge is
death penalty murder....
153 Id. at 984. Defendant Harris again contended that his waiver of jury trial
was not made knowingly and voluntarily in Harris v. State, 539 A.2d 637 (Md.
1988) (Harris II). The court rejected this contention because of its conclusion that
the defendant was familiar with the jury sentencing procedures. This familiarity
resulted from the court's explanation to Harris of the pertinent sentencing pro-
cedures in his earlier capital case, Harris v. State, 455 A.2d 979 (Md. 1983).
'- 374 S.E.2d 291 (S.C. 1988).
115 The entire colloquy with the defendant was as follows:
MR. BLUME: Your Honor, I think the thing that we need to put on the
record is that the Defense waived the Defendant's right to a jury and agreed
to try this case before Your Honor alone, and that that was done with the
Defendant's full knowledge, and on our advice.
COURT: Was that the consensus of all four attorneys?
MR. BLUME: It was a-unanimous. All four attorneys were in agreement
that that was the best way to proceed in this case, and the Defendant agreed.
COURT: Mr. Arthur, did you agree to that too?
MR. ARTHUR: Yes, sir.
COURT: To proceed before just the Judge and not before the jury?
MR. ARTHUR: Yes sir, Your Honor.
COURT: All right, you got any questions you want to ask me about the
difference in the two before we get started?
MR. ARTHUR: No sir, Your Honor.
Id. at 293.
156 Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Williams, 312 A.2d 597, 600 (Pa. 1973)).
157 Id.
151 State v. Arthur, 374 S.E.2d 291, 294 (S.C. 1988).
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In conclusion, the court reiterated that "[b]efore accepting a proffered
waiver in a criminal proceeding the trial court must conduct its own
direct and independent interrogation of the defendant. This insures that
the waiver is, in fact, knowing and voluntary in protection of the de-
fendant's rights."'159
V. PROPOSED PROCEDURE
As this Note has discussed, the right to trial by jury in a capital case
is of manifest importance. Likewise, the implications and ramifications
stemming from a jury waiver are, from the defendant's standpoint, of
equal if not greater importance. Moreover, retrospective review of chal-
lenges made by defendant's contesting the validity of jury waivers have
proven futile. Therefore, this Note implores the courts to adopt a formal,
mandatory, on-the-record colloquy with the defendant analogous to Rule
11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 16 0 Failure to perform this
interrogation should result in ipso facto reversal.
Initially, the court must inform the defendant that a capital proceeding
is divided into two phases: the guilt determination phase and the sub-
sequent sentencing phase. Because the first phase is the guilt determi-
nation phase and is identical to the typical trial, the courts should follow
the procedure adopted by the federal circuit courts. That is, the court
must inform the defendant that a jury is composed of twelve members of
the community and that the defendant may participate in the selection
of the jurors. In order to be found guilty, the court must inform the
defendant that the verdict must be unanimous and that a judge or panel
of judges will decide the defendant's guilt or innocence should the de-
fendant waive the right to trial by jury.161
159 d
- See generally FED. R. CiM. P. 11. In brief, Rule 11 requires the court to
inquire whether a defendant who pleads guilty understands the nature of the
charge against him and whether he is aware of the consequences of his pleas.
The Court in McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 465 (1969), addressed the
purposes behind Rule 11:
First, ... it is designed to assist the district judge in making the consti-
tutionally required determination that a defendant's guilty plea is truly
voluntary. Second, the Rule is intended to produce a complete record at the
time the plea is entered of the factors relevant to this voluntariness deter-
mination. Thus, the more meticulously the Rule is adhered to, the more it
tends to discourage, or at least to enable more expeditious disposition of,
the numerous and often frivolous post-conviction attacks on the constitu-
tional validity of guilty pleas.
Similarly, the Court's reasoning in McCarthy is equally applicable to proposed
procedure set forth in this Note.
161 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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Contingent upon finding the defendant guilty, the next phase is the
sentencing phase. With respect to the sentencing phase, the court must
first inform the defendant that the jury is given the task of weighing the
aggravating circumstances and mitigating factors. The court must also
inform the defendant that before the death penalty may be imposed, the
verdict must be unanimous; all twelve members must agree and rec-
ommend that the death penalty should be imposed. Conversely, the court
should inform the defendant that if one juror cannot agree on the penalty
of death, the court is precluded from imposing the death penalty. Also,
the defendant must be informed of the effect of a "jury deadlock." What
happens if the jury cannot unanimously agree on the death penalty? Does
"jury deadlock" result in the automatic imposition of a penalty less than
death or must the judge impanel a new jury? Finally, the court must
inform the defendant as to what effect the jury's recommendation is upon
the court. Is the jury's recommendation binding upon the court and thus
must be followed by the court? And, if not, what power does the judge
have if he or she is not in accord with the jury's recommendation? Must
the judge then impose a penalty less than death or is the judge permitted
to override the jury's recommendation and impose the death penalty over
life imprisonment?
Imparting this information to the defendant will help to ensure that
the defendant understands the basic mechanics of a jury trial in a capital
proceeding and therefore can make an informed decision.
VI. CONCLUSION
The death penalty is unique unto itself in many respects. One notable
aspect that sets the death penalty apart from other forms of punishment
is the uncustomary role the jury plays as the sentencer. Consequently,
the right to trial by jury in a death penalty proceeding is intrinsically
different; twelve members of the community are chosen to speak for the
community, assess the "moral guilt" of the defendant, and recommend
the appropriate sanction by correlating the crime committed with the
co/nmunity's moral sensibilities. The right to trial by jury, however, is
not absolute. Like other constitutional rights, the right to trial by jury
can be waived by the defendant, provided that the waiver is voluntary,
knowing, and intelligent. However, the courts' standards as to the suf-
ficiency of a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver vary widely. The
focal point of this Note has been whether the capital defendant has the
ability to make a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of the right
to trial by jury. This Note has argued that a capital defendant's knowledge
of the right to trial by jury in general, and more specifically, the role the
jury plays in a state's capital sentencing scheme is insufficient to make
a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver.
In an effort to remedy this deficiency, this Note implores that the courts
conduct a mandatory interrogation of the defendant, apprising him or
her of the nature and function of the jury and the jury's respective role
[Vol. 39:605
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in the state's capital sentencing scheme. The adaptation of such a pro-
cedure will help to more effectively ensure that the waiver is voluntary,
knowing, and intelligent. It will also emphasize to the defendant the
seriousness and significance of the waiver, and in the end, will save the
courts' time and effort by obviating challenges to the validity of waivers
on appeal or through habeas corpus proceedings. Indeed, as Justice Mar-
shall observed, "Requiring the court to impart this information accurately
is hardly imposing an unreasonable burden where the issue is literally
one of life and death.'
' 6 2
APPENDIX
Subsequent to the writing of this Note, the decision rendered by the
Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Jells was appealed to the Unites States
Supreme Court. On the eve of publication of this Note, certiorari was
denied.63 In his dissenting opinion from denial of certiorari, Justice Mar-
shall addressed the question of "whether petitioner's waiver of his right
to a jury trial was knowing and voluntary when there is no evidence that
petitioner was aware that his waiver also applied to his right to be sen-
tenced by a jury that could not impose death by less than a unanimous
vote and without the trial judge's independent agreement that death was
the proper sentence."'' Absent the imparting of this critical information,
Justice Marshall stated that "petitioner could not be understood to have
made a 'knowing' decision" in waiving his right to trial by jury.165
In so doing, Justice Marshall first addressed the vital role that the jury
plays in Ohio's capital sentencing scheme. In that regard, Justice Mar-
shall observed:
Under the Ohio Rule of Criminal Procedure, a felony defendant
who does not waive the right to a jury trial is tried by a twelve-
person jury. When the defendant is accused of a crime punish-
able by death, the same jury presides at both the guilt and
penalty phase. Unless the jury unanimously finds beyond rea-
sonable doubt that death is the proper sentence, the defendant
must be sentenced to life imprisonment with parole eligibility
after twenty or thirty years imprisonment. Significantly, even
if the jury unanimously recommends the death penalty, the
trial court must independently find beyond reasonable doubt
that death is the correct sentence before the defendant may be
sentenced to death.'"
162 Robertson v. California, 110 S. Ct. 216, 218 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
16 111 S. Ct. 1020 (1991).
- Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting)
166 Id.
I6 Id. at 1020-21 (internal citiations omitted).
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Citing the proposition that defendants who employ waivers of certain
constitutional rights such as a waiver through a guilty plea of the right
to trial or a waiver of the right to counsel must be made cognizant of the
"relevant circumstances and likely consequences," Justice Marshall op-
ined that an open court colloquy is needed to "determine whether the
defendant's waiver [of a jury trial] is made freely and intelligently."16 7
According to Justice Marshall, this reasoning applies with even greater
force "when a capital defendant's waiver of his jury trial right included
a waiver of his right to jury sentencing."' " In those instances "a searching
inquiry by the trial judge into the voluntary and knowing nature of the
waiver is not only sound practice but is constitutionally compelled.'
169
Against that background, Justice Marshall then addressed the parti-
cularily far-reaching consequences under Ohio law of a capital defend-
ant's jury trial waiver. Justice Marshall saliently observed:
As noted, had petitioner not waived his jury trial right in favor
of the three judge panel, his life would have been spared unless
all twelve jurors could have agreed that death was the proper
sentence, and unless the trial judge then independently deter-
mined that the jury reached the correct result. The practical
effect of petitioner in waiver, then, was to forfeit the right to
have ten additional decision makers review his punishment -
each of whom would have had the power to veto his death
sentence and some of whom might well have been less likely
to vote for the death sentence than the three judges on the
panel. 17
0
In light of these consequences, Justice Marshall concluded that the
trial court inquiry was constitutionally inadequate.17 1 Justice Marshall
noted:
The court did not determine whether petitioner fully under-
stood his entitlement to a jury trial - that is, whether he had
signed the waiver "with sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances and likely consequences" of his act. Nor did the
waiver itself cure this defect, since it did no more than inform
petitioner of his "constitutional right to be tried by jury." It did
not explain to him that he was also waiving his right to be
sentenced by a jury or that, in the absence of a waiver, he could
be sentenced to death only upon the jury's unanimous vote and
the independent approval of the trial judge.17 1
PAUL MANCINO, III
'o State v. Jells, 111 S. Ct. 1020, 1022 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
168Id.
169Id.
170 Id.
171 State v. Jells, 111 S. Ct. 1020, 1022 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
171 Id. at 1022-23 (internal citations omitted).
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